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GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND POLITICAL
COURAGE
Helen Norton*
Among the most prominent examples of government speech is a state's
choice to fly -or not to fly -the Confederate flag above or adjacent to its capi-
tol. The recent vigorous public debates in South Carolina and elsewhere across
the country reveal the potential power of governments' expressive choices, in-
cluding their power to inform, celebrate, cajole, wound, and disparage. Indeed,
any government's expressive choices expose a great deal about its values, prin-
ciples, and priorities -which in turn generate important public conversations.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has held that political accountability (ra-
ther than the Free Speech Clause) remains our recourse when the government
makes expressive choices with which we disagree: "When government speaks,
it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what
it says. That freedom in part reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral
process that first and foremost provides a check on government speech."1
Of course, the public can only hold government accountable for its expres-
sive choices when the public can attribute contested speech to the government.
Usually we have no problem identifying speech as the government's. For ex-
ample, consider not only South Carolina's longstanding choice to display the
Confederate flag (as well as its more recent decision to take it down), but also
the Surgeon General's warning about the dangers of tobacco-the public can
tell that the speech is the government's just by looking at or reading it.
Harder cases arise, however, when the expression's governmental source is
less apparent. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the speech at issue in
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. illustrate how
certain factors can sometimes obscure expression's source.2 In Walker, a divid-
ed Court upheld Texas's rejection of the Sons of Confederate Veterans' request
for a specialty license plate that would feature the Confederate flag; a 5-4 ma-
jority agreed with Texas that the words and images displayed on such plates
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245
(2015) (citation omitted).
2. Id. at 2248-52 (describing contested factors bearing on whether license plates are
considered government speech); id. at 2255-63 (Alito, J., dissenting) (same).
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reflected the state's own expression, which it remained free to control without
running afoul of the First Amendment.
3
Although I agree with the majority that specialty license plates can-and
often do-reflect the government's own expression, the Court in Walker again
missed an important opportunity to clarify and refine its government speech
doctrine to require that the government make clear when it is speaking before it
can assert the government speech defense to Free Speech Clause challenges.
Not only has the Court yet to settle on a test for distinguishing governmental
from private speech, but to date it has been far too quick to defer to govern-
ment's claim that the speech at issue is its own and thus immune from Free
Speech Clause scrutiny.
4
As I have urged in detail elsewhere, the Court should instead require a
government entity that asserts the government speech defense to establish that
it expressly claimed the speech as its own when it initially authorized the com-
munication (i.e., that it established the message's governmental source as a
formal matter) and that onlookers understood the speech to be the govern-
ment's at the time of its eventual delivery (i.e., that it established the message's
governmental source as a functional matter).5 This approach increases opportu-
nities for meaningful political accountability by identifying two points at which
government must expose its expressive choices to the public: when it chooses
to express a certain idea and when it actually delivers that message. Such an
approach would, at long last, recognize both that the value of government ex-
pression springs primarily from its capacity to inform the public of its govern-
ment's principles and priorities, and that the public can assess its government's
positions only when the public can tell that the government is speaking. This
requires the government to exercise the political courage to make its expressive
choices transparent o its public.
More specifically, requiring that government transparently identify itself as
the source of a message as a formal matter forces government o articulate, and
thus think carefully about, its expressive decisions up front-that is, at the time
that it makes them. In this manner, government affirmatively assumes political
responsibility for its expressive choices in exchange for its ability to successful-
3. Id. at 2253 (majority opinion).
4. For a brief history of the Court's government speech doctrine leading up to Walk-
er, see Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0., 87 DENY. U. L. REV.
899, 904-17, 916 n.87 (2010) ("In the four decisions characterized to date by the Court as
involving competing governmental and private claims to the same speech-Rust, Johanns,
Garcetti, and Summum -the Court held that contested speech was actually the government's
own speech so that government could control its content free from First Amendment scruti-
ny.").
5. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's
Control of Its Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DuKE L.J. 1, 27-28, 27
n.103 (2009); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression's




ly assert the government speech defense to Free Speech Clause claims.6 Such
an approach also helps address the "legitimate concern that the government
speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speak-
ers over others based on viewpoint."
7
In Walker, Texas complicated its government speech defense (and trig-
gered concerns about possible subterfuge) when it failed clearly to claim the
contested speech as its own at the time that it decided to reject the Sons of Con-
federate Veterans' proposed plate. More specifically, the Texas Board of Motor
Vehicles explained its decision on the grounds that "public comments ha[d]
shown that many members of the general public find the design offensive, and
because such comments are reasonable" and "a significant portion of the public
associate the confederate flag with organizations advocating expressions of
hate directed toward people or groups that is demeaning to those people or
groups."8 This description sounds as if Texas sought o protect onlookers from
offensive or unpopular viewpoints, rather than claim the plates' messages as its
own for which it took political responsibility. The difference is key for First
Amendment purposes: government cannot punish unpopular or offensive
speech, 9 but it can refuse to utter or join such expression itself. But not until it
faced a First Amendment challenge in court did Texas clearly lay claim to the
specialty plates as its own speech: "Texas is not willing to propagate the con-
federate battle flag by etching that image onto state-issued license plates that
bear the State' s name."
10
But even if government expressly announces its intent to claim authorship
of, and thus responsibility for, a certain message at the time of the message's
authorization, much of the public may remain unaware of this decision until-
and perhaps even when-that message is ultimately delivered, which under-
6. On the other hand, government remains free to decline to claim certain speech as
its own as a formal matter. It does this, for example, when it sells to private parties advertis-
ing space on, or the rights to name, its own property rather than claiming those expressive
spaces for its own messages. Of course, government's release of its claim to such expressive
opportunities means that any regulation of what is then private expression remains subject to
traditional free speech principles, including the ban on viewpoint discrimination against pri-
vate speakers. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
833-34 (1995) ("When the government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a
governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its mes-
sage is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee. It does not follow, however .... that
viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does not itself speak or subsi-
dize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers. A holding that the University may not discriminate based on
the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University's
own speech, which is controlled by different principles." (citation omitted)).
7. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473 (2009).
8. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245 (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 64-
65, Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (No. 14-144), 2014 WL 7498018).
9. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1971) (holding that the First
Amendment protects offensive speech).
10. Brief for the Petitioners at 1, Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (No. 14-144), 2014
WL 7497991.
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mines opportunities for meaningful political accountability. The Court should
thus additionally require the government to show that the expression is trans-
parently governmental as a functional matter-that is, that reasonable onlook-
ers will realize that such expression is the government's upon delivery or dis-
semination.
Although such an assessment is inevitably contextual, many areas of the
law require judges and juries to make similarly contextual determinations when
assessing reasonable individuals' perceptions and judgments. I Moreover, one
can draw additional guidance from a variety of specific triggers, or "source
cues," upon which individuals frequently rely to determine a message's ori-
gins. 12
Express source cues-in which the message expressly signals its origins at
the time of its delivery-are the most helpful. Obvious examples include gov-
ernment press statements or reports where the government expressly identifies
itself as the author or that are otherwise expressly attributed to a government
source. Because they are so clear, such express cues are especially helpful in
communicating a message's governmental origins to the public and thus facili-
tating meaningful political accountability. For this reason, governments eeking
to protect their expressive choices from Free Speech Clause scrutiny should de-
sign their communications to enhance transparency by employing express cues
whenever possible. As a functional matter, specialty license plates' prominent
display of the state's name provides an express cue to their governmental
source: "The governmental nature of the plates is clear from their faces: The
State places the name 'TEXAS' in large letters at the top of every plate." 13
A message's location also serves as a cue to its source. As the Court has
observed in several contexts, viewers often attribute messages to the owner of
11. For example, trademark infringement law requires courts to evaluate onlookers'
perceptions of a message's source. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multi-
factor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1589-90 (describing
courts' multifactor assessment of whether a defendant's use of a trademark is likely to con-
fuse onlookers about the product's actual source). In addition, the Court's Establishment
Clause doctrine sometimes requires courts to assess onlookers' likely perceptions of a reli-
gious display's source and meaning. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-
600 (1989) ("[T]he creche sits on the Grand Staircase, the 'main' and 'most beautiful part' of
the building that is the seat of county government. No viewer could reasonably think that it
occupies this location without the support and approval of the government." (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Joint Appendix at 157, Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (Nos. 87-2050, 88-90,
88-96))).
12. For an extensive discussion of the possible cues that onlookers and courts may use
to determine a message's source, see Norton, The Measure of Government Speech, supra
note 5, at 603-18.
13. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248; see also id. at 2250 ("Texas presents these designs on
government-mandated, government-controlled, and government-issued IDs that have tradi-
tionally been used as a medium for government speech. And it places the designs directly
below the large letters identifying 'TEXAS' as the issuer of the IDs.").
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the property on which they are displayed. 14 For this reason, a state's expressive
choice to display the Confederate (or some other) flag on its own property
strongly signals its governmental source to the public.
To be sure, although specialty license plates prominently feature the state's
name-and are generally manufactured, issued, and owned by the state-
several dynamics may obscure their governmental origin as a functional matter.
First, states (including Texas) often invite private speakers to propose specialty
license plate messages for the state's consideration and approval; this, in turn,
often results in a large and diverse number of plates and messages. Some argue
that private speakers' input into the messages' development frustrates the pub-
lic's ability to ascertain their governmental source- especially when that input
results in the production of a wide variety of messages.15 But because many
speakers draw from others' input when making their own expressive choices
(and also may have different things to say on many different issues), the gov-
ernment's decision to encourage and select from a large number and variety of
messages does not necessarily undennine its expressive claim to the choices
that it ultimately makes. This is especially the case when the government en-
sures that express or similarly strong cues transparently signal the message's
governmental source.
For an illustration, consider the United States Postal Service's Citizens'
Stamp Advisory Committee. Although the Committee invites suggestions from
the public as to who or what might be honored with a postage stamp, the Postal
Service expressly maintains control over the ultimate decision to issue multiple
stamps that express a variety of messages.16 The Postal Service's 2015 slate of
commemorative stamps demonstrates this point, as it celebrates a diverse col-
lection that includes the Special Olympics, Flannery O'Connor, the Civil War,
and penguins. 17 The government remains the source of these multiple messages
as both a formal and functional matter: not only did the Postal Service make
clear its intent to speak for itself in choosing who and what to feature on post-
age stamps (even while it invited public input), but express source cues-
namely, the identifier "USA" on the stamps themselves -ensure that onlookers
understand the message's ource as governmental.
14. See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 470-72 (explaining how the messages communi-
cated by monuments in public parks are generally attributed to the government as owner);
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 48, 54-56 (1994) (striking down a city ban on home-
owners' posting of signs on free speech grounds and observing that the city had foreclosed a
commonplace and effective means of signaling a message's speaker).
15. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798-99 (4th Cir.
2004) ("The array of choices makes the license plate forum appear increasingly like a forum
for private speech. As the citizen becomes less likely to associate specialty plate messages
with the State, the State's accountability for any message is correspondingly diminished.").
16. See Process, U.S. POSTAL SERV. CITIZENS' STAMP ADVISORY CoMM., https://about
.usps.com/who-we-are/csac/process.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
17. CurrentlyJor Sale, U.S. POSTAL SERV. STAMPS, http://uspsstamps.com/stamps (last
visited Oct. 30, 2015).
October 2015]
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A more important confounding factor is that specialty license plates are
displayed on drivers' own property-their cars-even though they are pro-
duced (and generally owned) by the government. As discussed above, onlook-
ers often rely on a message's location as a cue to its source, concluding that it
reflects the view of the property owner. For this reason, as I have urged else-
where in detail, we should recognize specialty license plates as the joint speech
of both the government and those private parties who choose to display those
plates.18 In other words, sometimes speech may most accurately be described
as simultaneously reflecting the views of speakers-both public and private-
who have chosen to share a message. Examples include situations where a pub-
lic actor offers private speakers the choice to join and display the government's
own speech-a choice that may be especially attractive when it signals the
government's imprimatur. Such a concept of "joint speech" values both speak-
ers' expressive choices: those who agree with the government's view may
choose to buy and display those messages, but government may not compel an-
yone to do so, nor prevent anyone from expressing their own differing views.
Longstanding doctrine in other free speech settings lends support to this
conception of joint expression. For example, in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, the Court did not contest the state's expressive power to
decide to start the public school day with the Pledge of Allegiance, even though
it held that the First Amendment did not pennit the state to compel dissenting
schoolchildren to join that expression by saluting the flag.19 Similarly, in
Wooley v. Maynard, the Court did not challenge New Hampshire's expressive
choice to feature its motto "Live Free or Die" on the state's license plates, but it
denied government the power to require a private speaker to display this mes-
sage against his will. 2° In neither case did the Court suggest hat the objectors
could force the government to deliver a message more to their liking.
Recognizing that joint speech requires the consent of both parties simulta-
neously accommodates individual autonomy as well as government's interest in
protecting its own expressive choices. States that choose to claim specialty li-
cense plates as reflecting their own views and thus exempt themselves from
Free Speech Clause scrutiny should be able to do so, as long as they design the
program to ensure formal as well as functional transparency, and thus meaning-
ful political accountability. As a practical matter, this requires government
transparently to claim the expression as its own up front as well as to design its
communications to enhance, rather than obscure, transparency upon delivery,
ideally by employing express cues whenever possible.
As Walker demonstrates, the most difficult government speech cases in-
volve various fonns of interaction or collaboration between government and
private speakers in contexts that create doubt about the source of contested ex-
pression. Because government's growing use of blogs, social media platforms,
18. Norton, The Measure of Government Speech, supra note 5, at 618-22.
19. 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943).
20. 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
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virtual worlds, and other online platforms greatly enhances uch opportunities
for interaction and collaboration, these controversies will continue to increase
in number. Here too, attention to formal and functional transparency can and
should inform government's approach to new expressive technologies.2 1 Gov-
ernment should take the time and trouble to ask and answer these key ques-
tions: Does the government seek to engage in its own expression for which it is
willing to be held politically accountable in exchange for insulation from First
Amendment scrutiny? Or is the government instead providing some sort of op-
portunity for private speech, for which it disclaims political responsibility? The
consequences of this choice are significant: If the former, the government
should take steps to affirmatively identify itself as the source of this message. If
the latter, the First Amendment requires that the government refrain from regu-
lating such speech on the basis of viewpoint.
In short, the Court should demand transparency from the government as a
condition of recognizing the government speech defense to Free Speech Clause
challenges to the government's expressive choices. Transparency, in turn, re-
quires a bit of planning and some political courage. That's not too much to ask.
21. For a more detailed discussion of the government speech challenges raised by gov-
ernment's increasing reliance on emerging communicative technologies, see Norton & Cit-
ron, supra note 4, at 920-35.
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